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Peters: Constitutional Law--Amending Constitutions--Construction
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

STRUCTION. -

AMENDING

CONSTITUTIONS

-

CON-

According to Lord Selden the rules of equity vary

with the chancellor's foot; the rules of law follow a more Procrustean example. The rules of constitutional construction are,
if possible,.even more strict. Yet the Court of Appeals in Herold
v. Townsend, Tax Comm.,' has abandoned all rules, all the safety
of certainty in the iteipretation of' constitutions for a willa'-thewisp of "substatntial compliance".
On a petition for writ of mandamus to require the state tax
commissioner to revoke instructions to assessors issued under the
authority of the Tax Limitation Amendment it was alleged that
the amendment failed for want of regular adoption - the amendment not having been published in the several counties of the
state at least three months prior to the election as required by the
constitution.2 The evidence indicates that the amendment was
published as required by the constitution in only fifteen counties.!
In the remaining counties according to the more favorable evidence
it was published four or five days after the expiration of the
statutory period.'
The question for the court was simply this: Does the constitution requirement of publication mean three months when it says
three months, or does it mean three months and four days? Similarly when it requires that there be publication in every county
which has a newspaper, does it mean every county or nearly every
county.
The court answers that the provisions of constitutions concerning.the amendatory process are mandatory and directory and
thus by all the rules must be strictly interpreted? The magic of
'State ex rel. Herold v. Townsend, Tax Com 'r., 169 S. E. 74 (W. Va.,
1933).
2
It shall be the duty of the LegisW. Va. Const., Art. 14, Sec. 2. ," ....
cause the same to be published, at least three months before
lature to ....
such election in some newspaper in every county in which a newspaper is
printed."
' In the counties of Brooke, Cabell, Hancock, Harrison, Kanawha, Marion,
Marshall, Mercer, Mingo, McDowell, Ohio, Randolph, Summers, Taylor and
Tyler. See Harold v. Townsend, supra n. 1, at 75.
'Less favorable evidence suggests that in some counties publication was
much later; that the text of the amendment was difficult or impossible to
procure; and that in at least three counties the amendment was not even
included on the ballot.
5Some courts interpret all constitutional provision as mandatory. District
Board, eto., v. Bradley, 188 Ky. 426, 222 S. W. 518 (1920); Commonwealth
v. Bowman, 191 Ky. 647, 231 S. W. 35 (1921) ; People v. Lawrence, 36 Barb.
177 (N. Y. 1862). Most states, however, including West Virginia, hold that

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1933

1

WestVIRGINIA
Virginia LawLAW
Review,QUARTERLY
Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [1933], Art. 8
WEST
these words seems dead, however, when we learn that though the
provisions is mandatory substantial compliance with its terms is
sufficient.' But the court rejoins, 335,482 persons voted for the
amendment, only 43,931 against it. Mr. Dooley is vindicated."
Of what legal significance is the vote? Had the suit been brought
before the election to remove the amendment from the ballot the
question would still have arisen. Should the favorable vote make
any difference '
The court urges that "the publication, so far as actual notice
to the electorate was concerned, was necessarily far superior to
that which could have been accorded an amendment submitted
soon after the adoption of our Constitution in 1872- Today there
is not a county in the state which does not receive copies of some
daily published in the state on the date of its publication."' By
the same token if proof of greater efficiency could be accorded
radio reception would the court consider that a valid substitution
or should we say compliance ?1o
The court cites as precedent seven decisions from as many
cusually" constitutional provisions are to be construed as mandatory.
Lemons v. State, 4 W. Va. 755, 6 Am. Rep. 293 (1870); Capito v. Topping,
65 W. Va. 587, 64 S. E. 845 (1909); Simms v. Sawyers, 85 W. Va. 245, 101
S. E. 467 (1919); Parker v. State, 133 Ind. 178, 32 N. E. 836 (1892);
Barkley v. Pool, 102 Neb. 799, 169 N. W. 730 (1918); Boyd v. Olcott, 102
Ore. 327, 202 Pac. 431 (1921); State v. Dixon, 66 Mont. 76, 213 Pac. 227
(1923); Powell v. State, 193 Ind. 258, 139 N. E. 670 (1923); State v. Malcorn, 39 Idaho 185, 226 Pac. 1083 (1924).
"It' is a contradiction in terms that there may be substantial compliance
with a provision which is mandatory. A mandatory provision requires exact
and literal compliance. I"When the constitution designates in express terms
the time when a fundamental act shall be done, and is silent as to performance at any other time, such act cannot be done at any other time."
State
v. Johnson, 26 Ark. 281 (1870); In re Opinions of the Justices, 18 Me.
(6 Shep.) 458 (1841).
S"eThe court follows th' iliction rethurns" as quoted by Pound, Sprious
Interpretation (1907) 7 CoL. L. Rav. 379 at 385.
S"The provisions of the Constitution . . . . are mandatory and binding
not only upon the legislative assembly but also upon all the people as well;
and, consequently a failure to observe the mandates of the Constitution is
fatal to a proposed amendment, even though the electors have with practical
unanimity voted for it." Boyd v. Oleott, 102 Ore. 327, 359, 202 Pac. 431,
441 (1921). "However large a majority of the electorate may have voted
upon the proposed amendment, even though the members of the Senate and
Assembly may have been unanimous in their vote on a submission of the
amendment to the people, the Constitution nevertheless will remain unchanged
if any of the requirements, express or implied, contained in article 14, are
not strictly observed and complied with."
Browne v. City of New York,
213 App. Div. 206, 211 N. Y. Sppp. 306 (1925), reversing judgment 125
Misc. 1 (1925), 210 N. Y. Supp. 786, order affirmed 241 N. Y. 96, 149 X.
E. 211 (1926).
"1Supran. 1, at 77.
10 Quaere, what result if the amendment was not passed by the requisite
two-thirds vote in each house of the legislature, but was correctly published
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states supporting the proposition that substantial compliance, is
sufficient compliance.'
The court's silence in failing to consider
cases offered by counsel for the relator is not impressive." Indeed to make a straw man of Mcreary v. Speer," and agilely
knock it over by showing that there the deviation from the constitutional standard was much greater than in the Herold case is
not persuasive. ' What of the language in Capito v. Topping,"
and adopted by an overwhelming vote of the peoplel Would it matter if
there was only one vote less than the two-thirds required? Would this be
substantial compliance?
hAs long as the West Virginia court treats the amendment requirement
as mandatory, the seven cases cited in support of their position are, in part,
distinguishable. Those cases treat the constitutional requirements which they
are applying as directory. When the provision is mandatory they require
strict compliance. See, for example, the dissenting opinion in Marten v.
Poster, 68 Mont. 450, 219 Pac. 817 (1923), and also the early Montana eases
now apparently abandoned. State ex Tel. v. Tooker, 15 Mont. 8, 37 Pac. 840
(1894); Durfee v. Harper, 22 Mont. 354, 56 Pac. 582. Likewise, see State v.
Sessions, 87 Kan. 497, 124 Pac. 483 (1912); State ex Tel. v. Gordon, 251 Mo.
303, 158 S. W. 683 (1913); Hunt v. State, 22 Tex. App. 397, 38 S. W. 233
(1886); Wells v. Bain, 75 Pa. St. 39 (1874).
"What of the cases cited by the relator? Why should only McCreary v.
Speer, infra n. 13, be selected for consideration? The court had before it
cases urging the necessity of strict compliance with mandatory requirements.
See, Johnson v. Craft, 205 Ala. 386, 87 So. 375 (1921); McBee v. Brady,
Governor, 15 Idaho 761, 100 Pac. 97 (1909); State ex Tel. Woods v. Tooker,
15 Mont. 8, 37 Pac. 804 (1894); Crawford v. Gilchrist, 64 Fla. 41, 59 So.
963 (1912); State v. Zimmerman, 187 Wis. 180, 204 N. W. 803 (1925);
Browne v. City of New York, 241 N. Y. 96, 149 N. E. 211 (1925);
McAdams v. Henley, 169 Ark. 97, 273 S. W. 355 (1925); Oakland Paving
Co. v. Hilton, 69 Cal. 479, 11 Pac. 3 (1886); State ex Tel. Stevenson v. Tufloy,
19 Nev. 391, 12 Pac. 835 (1887); State ex tel. Bailey v. Brookhart, 113 Ia.
250, 84 N. W. 1064 (1901); Switzer v. State, 103 Ohio St. 306, 133 N. 1.
552 (1921).
A consideration of opinion of the Justices, 6 Cush. 573 (Mass., 1833); Hunt
v. State, supra n. 10; Wells v. Bain, supra n. 10, would likewise have been
useful.
156 Ky. 783, 162 S. W. 99 (1913).
"4The Kentucky provision concerning publication was, as our own, ninety
days. By mistake the secretary of state did not publish the amendment until
sixty days prior to the election, but he then gave it additional publicity in
an attempt to rectify the error. The court refused to sustain the procedure.
But the West Virginia court distinguishes this case because of the greater
disparity between the day on which the amendment was actually published
and the day it was required to be published. But what of the additional
publicity? If additional publicity could not save the amendment in the
McCreary case why should the improved methods in the dissemination of information validate the publication in the Herold case. It is difficult to see
how the number of days of non-compliance can be important. Publication
is a part of the amendatory process; if the vote was not sufficient, clearly
the amendment would be declared lost. Voting like publication is only a
part of the process. If one of the steps calculated to influence the vote was
not complied with it is difficult to say what a vote might have been if taken
according to the constitutional requirements. For example, there were only
335,482 votes cast in favor of the amendment, there were 748,225 votes cast
for the office of governor, and at the primaries in May, 931,378 votes were
recorded.

65 W. Va. 587, 64 S. E. 845 (1909).
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where the court said, "Nor have we any doubt that it (the governor's veto) must be filed within the prescribed time. If not
within five days, then within how many? Who shall say? Is not
a time limit, beyond which the citizen must know the fate of an
If there must be certainty in the statact passed, important?''
ute law, is there not a like need for certainty in the superior law
of the constitution?
If there are not adequate means by which the constitution
can be amended then there is need for a new constitutional convention; but there is no excuse for the court to remake the law
to reach a popular result. Decisions such as Herold v. Townsend,u make even the amendatory phase of constitutional law in
West Virginia no more than an unpredictable guess. Even the
conservative, after such a decision, would agree with Jerome
Frank that "What the courts in fact do is to manipulate the
language of former decisions. ' ' If judicial humility is more
than a misleading myth it is time that courts fearlessly apply the
law as it is and not as they wish it."
-TRixy M. PETERS.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

DISCRIMINATION IN

ASSESSMENT

TAxATION AS DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS. -

FOR

An

electric power plant was assessed at one hundred per cent of its
actual value while all other properties in the county in the same
An
class were assessed at only eighty per cent of their value.
appeal was taken from an order affirming the assessment of the
Board of Equalization, and the Supreme Court of Appeals, two
judges dissenting, held the assessment a denial of equal protection
of the law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, by reason of which the power company was entitled to
have its property assessed on the same basis as other properties
in the same class. West Penn Power Co. v. Board of Review and
Equalization of Brooke County.1
There is nothing unique about this proposition of law. It
merely brings the West Virginia court in line with a long list
I'Supra n. 15, at 592.
1
7Supra n. 1.
1

8LAw AND THE MODERN M= (1931) 148.
10"One swallow alone doesn't make the summer".

Nor do seven scattered

cases make the law.
1 164 S. E. 862 (W. Va., 1932).
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